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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Robert Cassidy Hansen appeals from his judgment of conviction for 
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and leaving the scene of an 
injury accident. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Hansen was in the turning lane at an intersection when he turned into 
oncoming traffic without yielding. (PSI, p.2.) As Hansen made the turn, he 
struck and injured a motorcyclist, Donovan Jones. (PSI, p.2.) Hansen did not 
stop but proceeded down the road at a "high rate of speed." (PSI, p.2.) Officers 
located Hansen and "Hansen had an odor of alcohol coming from his person, 
glassy eyes, slurred speech, and impaired balance." (PSI, p.2.) Hansen 
admitted to drinking alcohol that evening and a blood draw showed Hansen's 
blood alcohol content to be .217. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Hansen reported that he 
consumed "four or five 4 Lokos in approximately four hours." (PSI, p.4.) Jones' 
injuries included "a dislocated hip, possible hip and leg fractures, and several 
large lacerations on his lower extremities." (PSI, p.3.) 
The state charged Hansen with aggravated driving under the influence of 
alcohol and leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., pp.61-62.) Pursuant to 
a plea agreement, Hansen pied guilty to both charges. (R., pp.101-1 O; Tr., p.14, 
Ls.1-4; p.15, Ls.8-11.) The state agreed to recommend a sentence of three 
years fixed with 12 years indeterminate on the aggravated DUI charge and zero 
years fixed with five years indeterminate on the leaving the scene of an injury 
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accident charge. (R., p.111; Tr., p.10, Ls.5-8.) The state also agreed to 
recommend that "the sentences run concurrently and that the sentences be 
served." (R., p.111; Tr., p.10, Ls.8-10.) The plea agreement contained the 
following provision: 
By accepting this offer the defendant waives the right to: (1) file a 
Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal sentence) and (2) appeal 
any issues in this case, including all matters involving the plea or 
the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all 
suppression issues. However, the defendant may appeal the 
sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate portion of the 
State's sentencing recommendation of the "Jail/Prison terms" set 
forth above. 
(R., p.111 (emphasis original).) Hansen and his attorney both signed the 
agreement and, in doing so, Hansen specifically acknowledged:"/ have read the 
offer, I understand it, and I accept the offer on the above-stated terms." (R., 
p.111 (emphasis original).) At the entry of plea hearing, the district court asked 
Hansen, "If the court follows the state's recommendation and orders a 3-to-15 
year sentence or does something less, do you understand that you have waived 
all right to appeal that determination or any other issue in this case?" (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.10-15.) Hansen stated that he understood. (Tr., p.13, L.16.) 
Prior to the sentencing hearing on those convictions, Hansen pied guilty to 
the new charge of domestic violence and the district court consolidated the 
matters for sentencing. (R., pp.242-51; Tr., p.27, Ls.10-12; p.29, Ls.6-11.) At 
the sentencing hearing, the district court asked the parties, "Will there be any 
individuals to address the court either formally or informally today or evidence to 
present prior to argument?" (Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.32, L.2.) Hansen submitted 
letters from the Victory Home and a friend, and two pastors made informal 
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statements on his behalf. (Tr., p.32, Ls.3-23; p.33, Ls.9-12.) The state 
presented informal statements from Hansen's wife, who was the victim in the 
domestic violence case, Jones, the victim in this case, and Jones' father. (Tr., 
p.33, Ls.2-8, 13-18.) Hansen objected to the statement from Jones' father, 
contending that Jones' father was not a "victim" in the case. (Tr., p.36, Ls.5-10.) 
The district court noted the objection, but allowed Jones' father to make a 
statement. (Tr., p.36, Ls.20-22.) The state recommended five years fixed with 
ten years indeterminate "in the aggravated DUI and the leaving the scene of the 
accident" case. 1 (Tr., p.52, Ls.21-24.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of three years fixed with 12 years indeterminate on Hansen's 
aggravated DUI conviction and a unified sentence of three years fixed with two 
years indeterminate on Hansen's leaving the scene of an injury accident 
conviction. (R., p.145; Tr., p.66, Ls.8-13.) The district court ordered the 
sentences to run concurrent with each other.2 (R., p.145; Tr., p.66, L.12.) 
Thereafter, Hansen filed a Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.149-50.) The state 
chose not to object to the motion (R., p.160), although the plea agreement 
prohibited Hansen from filing "a Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal 
1 Under the terms of the plea agreement, the state was allowed to request 
greater sentences than the state originally recommended in the plea agreement 
due to Hansen's new domestic violence conviction and the drug charges that 
were filed against Hansen prior to sentencing. (R., p.111.) 
2 On the domestic violence conviction, the district court sentenced Hansen to a 
five year indeterminate sentence that was ordered to run consecutive with the 
other sentences. (R., pp.256-61; Tr., p.66, Ls.18-21.) Hansen is not challenging 
his sentence for domestic violence on appeal. (Appellant's brief, p.2; Order 
Granting Motion to Sever Consolidated Appeals and Dismiss Case No. 39062-
2011.) 
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sentence)." (R., pp.111.) The district court denied Hansen's Rule 35 motion 
without a hearing. (R., pp.158-61.) Hansen timely appealed. (R., pp.163-65.) 
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ISSUES 
Hansen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is Mr. Hansen's appeal of his underlying sentence permitted 
under the terms of the appellate waiver contained within his 
plea agreement? 
2. Did the district court err when it permitted the father of the 
adult victim of one of Mr. Hansen's underlying offenses to 
provide a victim impact statement at sentencing over Mr. 
Hansen's objection? 
3. Did the district court impose excessive sentences for Mr. 
Hansen's underlying criminal convictions, and thereby abuse 
the court's discretion? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should Hansen be allowed to appeal his sentence for leaving the scene of 
an injury accident, but not his sentence for aggravated DUI, because he 
only retained the right to appeal the sentence on which the district court 
exceeded the determinate portion recommended by the state in the plea 
agreement? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing the victim's father to 
make an informal statement at the sentencing hearing? 
3. Has Hansen failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Hansen Should Only Be Allowed to Appeal His Sentence For Leaving The Scene 
Of An Injury Accident Because The District Court Imposed The Sentence 
Recommended In The Plea Agreement On Hansen's Aggravated DUI Conviction 
A. Introduction 
Hansen argues "that the district court's sentences of 15 years, with three 
years fixed, upon his guilty plea to aggravated driving under the influence and 
five years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to leaving the scene of an 
injury accident were excessive, and therefore constituted an abuse of the court's 
discretion." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) However, under the appellate waiver, 
Hansen may only "appeal the sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate 
portion of the State's sentencing recommendation of the 'Jail/Prison terms' set 
forth" in the plea agreement. (R., p.111.) The "Jail/Prison terms" section of the 
plea agreement states that the state "will recommend a sentence of 3 years fixed 
with 12 indeterminate for a total of 15 years on" the aggravated DUI charge. (R., 
p.111.) The district court imposed the sentence recommended in the plea 
agreement on that charge and, therefore Hansen cannot appeal that sentence. 
(R., pp.111, 145; Tr., p.66, Ls.8-10.) 
The only sentence Hansen can properly appeal under the terms of the 
plea agreement is his sentence for leaving the scene of an i17jury accident 
because the district court imposed a greater determinate portion on that charge 
than the state recommended in the plea agreement. (R., p.145; Tr., p.66, 11-
13.) As such, Hansen's appeal from his sentence for aggravated DUI should be 
dismissed. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract 
law standards, and as a question of law, [the appellate court] exercises free 
review." State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004)). Where the waiver 
of the right to appeal is entered as part of a plea agreement, the appellate court 
"employ[s] the same analysis as [itJ would in determining the validity of any plea 
of guilty." State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456,457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994) 
C. The Record Shows That Hansen Knowingly And Voluntarily Waived His 
Right To Appeal His Sentence For Aggravated DUI 
The right of a criminal defendant to appeal matters relating to his 
conviction and/or sentence is a statutory right that may be waived. Cope, 142 
Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho at 457, 872 P.2d at 720 
(citing I.C. § 19-2801 ). When the waiver of the right to appeal is included as a 
term of a plea agreement, such waiver is enforceable as long as the record 
shows that it was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Cope, 142 Idaho 
at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho at 457, 872 P.2d at 720; State v. 
Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482,484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct App. 1997).3 
Hansen acknowledges that the district court imposed the sentence 
recommended in the plea agreement on his aggravated DUI conviction. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Nonetheless, Hansen argues that he can appeal his 
3 Hansen does not challenge the voluntariness of his plea agreement and the 
record shows that Hansen's appellate waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently made. (R., pp.104, 111; Tr., p.13, Ls.9-20.) 
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aggravated DUI sentence because the district court exceeded the determinate 
portion recommended in the plea agreement on his leaving the scene of an 
injury accident conviction. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) This argument is without 
merit. 
The plea agreement is unambiguous. In exchange for Hansen's guilty 
plea to "Count 1: Aggravated DUI" and "Count II: Leaving the Scene of an Injury 
Accident," the state agreed to recommend a sentence of 15 years with three 
years fixed on the aggravated DUI charge and a sentence of five years with zero 
years fixed on the leaving the scene of an injury accident charge. (R., p.111.) 
Hansen agreed as a term of the plea agreement to waive the right to: 
appeal any issues in this case, including all matters involving the 
plea or the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including 
all suppression issues. However, the defendant may appeal the 
sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate portion of the 
State's sentencing recommendation of the "Jail/Prison terms" set 
forth above. 
(R., p.111 (emphasis original).) Hansen and his attorney both signed the 
agreement and, in so doing, Hansen specifically acknowledged: "/ have read 
the offer$ I understand it$ and I accept the offer on the above-stated terms." 
(R., p.111 (emphasis original).) The district court then imposed a sentence 
identical to the recommendation set forth in the "Jail/Prison terms" section of the 
plea agreement on the aggravated DUI conviction, but imposed a greater 
determinate sentence than the state recommended in the plea agreement on the 
leaving the scene of an injury accident conviction. (R., pp.111, 145; Tr., p.66, 
Ls.8-13.) 
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Pursuant to the plain language of the plea agreement, Hansen waived his 
right to appeal "any issues in this case, including all matters involving the plea or 
the sentencing and any rulings made by the court," with the only exception being 
that Hansen retained the right to "appeal the sentence if the Court exceeds the 
determinate portion of the State's sentencing recommendation of the 'Jail/Prison 
terms' set forth" in the plea agreement. (R., p.111.) Accordingly, Hansen can 
only appeal from the sentence that the district court exceeded the determinate 
portion of the state's sentencing recommendation on, which is Hansen's 
sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., p.145; Tr., p.66, Ls.8-
13.) 
Despite the appellate waiver, Hansen attempts to appeal from both 
sentences even though the district court imposed the sentence recommended in 
the plea agreement on his aggravated DUI conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp.7, 
13-18.) However, Hansen is expressly prohibited from challenging his sentence 
for aggravated DUI because the district court imposed the sentence that was 
stipulated to in the plea agreement. Therefore, Hansen only retained the right to 
appeal his sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident and his appeal 
from his aggravated DUI sentence should be dismissed.4 
4 Because Hansen retained the right to appeal his sentence for leaving the scene 
of an injury accident, it appears that he also retained the right to challenge the 
district court's ruling on the admissibility of the statement made by the victim's 
father at the sentencing hearing. See Cope, 142 Idaho at 499, 129 P .3d at 1248 
(noting that "[rJetention of the right to appeal a sentence ... extends to underlying 
information that forms the basis of the sentence."). 
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11. 
Hansen Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Allowing The Victim's Father To Make A Statement At The Sentencing Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Hansen contends the district court erred by allowing the victim's father to 
make a statement at the sentencing hearing because the victim's father does not 
qualify as a "victim" under I.C. § 19-5306. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) However, I.C. 
§ 19-5306 does not limit the types of information that the district court can 
consider at sentencing as Hansen suggests. Hansen has failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion in ruling on the admissibility of the informal 
statement made by the victim's father at sentencing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court presumes that the sentencing court is able to 
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and 
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process. State v. Pierce, 
100 Idaho 57, 58, 593 P .2d 392, 393 (1979); State v. Bundy, 122 Idaho 111, 831 
P.2d 953 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Holmes, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct. 
App. 1983). 
C. Hansen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
At Sentencing By Allowing The Victim's Father To Make An Informal 
Statement 
Although I.C. § 19-5306 confers a right in victims to address the court, it is 
not a limiting statute, and it does not create the only mechanism whereby the 
court may accept evidence at sentencing. To the contrary, it is well settled that a 
district court "has broad discretion in determining what evidence is to be admitted 
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at a sentencing hearing." State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 625, 851 P.2d 336, 
339 (1993) (quoting State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 583, 618 P.2d 759, 761 
(1980)). A defendant is denied due process when the sentencing court relies 
upon information that is materially untrue or when the court makes materially 
false assumptions of fact. State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172, 997 P .2d 626, 
633 (Ct. App. 2000). Even if the victim's father in this case did not have the right 
to address the court under I.C. § 19-5306, Hansen has shown no violation of the 
district court's discretion. 
Hansen relies on State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008), 
which was a capital punishment case, for the proposition that "the inflammatory 
nature of the victim impact evidence received" should be considered in 
determining whether "the district court's error in permitting improper victim impact 
evidence to be introduced was harmless." (Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) 
However, the harmless error standard set forth in Payne is inapplicable in this 
case because Hansen has not established that the district court erred in allowing 
the victim's father to make an informal statement at sentencing. Furthermore, 
Hansen clearly failed to preserve the issue of whether the statement made by 
the victim's father at sentencing was inflammatory because Hansen did not 
object to the content of the statement.5 State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 
P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000) ("It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a 
proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is 
5 Hansen only objected to the statement from Jones' father on the grounds that 
Jones' father was not a "victim" in the case. (Tr., p.36, Ls.5-10.) 
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preserved for appeal."). 
In a non-capital case, where the sentencing decision is made by a judge 
rather than a jury, the Idaho appellate courts presume that the sentencing court 
is able to ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information 
and material which is presented to it during the sentencing process. Pierce, 100 
Idaho at 58, 593 P.2d at 393; Bundy, 122 Idaho at 113, 831 P.2d at 955; 
Holmes, 104 Idaho at 314, 658 P.2d at 985. "A sentencing judge may properly 
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited, either as to kind of 
information considered or the source from which it may come." State v. Wickel, 
126 Idaho 578, 580, 887 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. 
Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
Here, the district court exercised its discretion and allowed Hansen to 
submit letters from the Victory Horne and allowed two pastors to make informal 
statements on Hansen's behalf. (Tr., p.32, Ls.3-23; p.33, Ls.9-12.) The district 
court allowed the state to present informal statements from Hansen's wife, who 
was the victim in the domestic violence case, Jones, the victim in this case, and 
Jones' father. (Tr., p.33, Ls.2-8, 13-18.) Hansen has failed to establish that the 
district court abused the discretion it has to receive and consider a broad range 
of information in fashioning an appropriate sentence. Because the district court 
did not err in allowing the information presented at sentencing, it is unnecessary 
to consider whether any of the statements made were inflammatory under the 
harmless error standard. This Court should affirm Hansen's sentence. 
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111. 
Hansen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Hansen asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with three years fixed for aggravated DUI 
and a unified sentence of five years with three years fixed for leaving the scene 
of an injury accident. (Appellant's brief, p.13.) As discussed above, Hansen 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence for aggravated 
DUI. Furthermore, even if the appellate waiver does not apply to Hansen's 
sentence for aggravated DUI, Hansen has failed to establish that the district 
court abused its discretion in imposing either sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 
(2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 
391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a 
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). 
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C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
Hansen asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
"sentences of 15 years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty plea to aggravated 
driving under the influence and five years, with three years fixed, upon his guilty 
plea to leaving the scene of an injury accident" in light of his "rehabilitative 
potential," his "troubled childhood," and his family support. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.13-18.) 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, 
however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting 
society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution. 19..:. 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the 
objectives of sentencing, the seriousness of Hansen's offenses, his criminal 
history, and his amenability to treatment. (See generally Tr., p.62, L.19 - p.67, 
L.7.) The district court also considered the trauma Hansen has faced in his life 
and his family support. (Tr., p.63, Ls.2-3, 11-13; p.64, Ls.12-13.) 
Although Hansen is relatively young, he has an extensive criminal history 
that includes juvenile convictions for incorrigible, runaway, truancy, battery, 
burglary, minor in possession of alcohol, and escape. (PSI, pp.4-6, 14-15.) 
Hansen was committed to the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections in 2007 
and placed in the Choices program. (PSI, p.15.) Hansen was released one year 
14 
later, but he continued to violate the law by committing the crimes of minor in 
possession of alcohol and resisting and obstructing. (PSI, p.15.) 
As an adult, Hansen was convicted of willful concealment and he received 
four additional convictions for minor in possession of alcohol. (PSI, pp.6, 15.) 
While the instant case was pending, Hansen pied guilty to domestic violence (R., 
pp.242-51; Tr., p.27, Ls.10-12), and he had charges pending for possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (PSI, pp.6-7.) 
Hansen has not performed "well on juvenile probation or adult misdemeanor 
probation" in the past. (PSI, p.15.) 
Hansen has been abusing drugs and alcohol since he was nine years old 
and he is a former gang member. (PSI, pp.9, 12-13.) He has completed both 
inpatient and outpatient treatment programs for his substance abuse issues, 
however, he was only able to remain clean and sober "approximately three 
months" after inpatient treatment and "a month or so" after outpatient treatment. 
(PSI, p.13.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court recognized that Hansen 
has been struggling with "substance abuse and alcoholism" from a "very young 
age," but noted that Hansen is a "young man who was given a myriad of options 
and opportunities to rehabilitate and to turn it around, which, until recently it 
appears, [Hansen] totally ignored or simply denied any effort to make a change 
in [his] life." (Tr., p.62, L.24 - p.63, L.B.) 
The district court also recognized that Hansen committed two very serious 
offenses in this case. (Tr., p.64, Ls.2-10.) Hansen drove while intoxicated and 
hit a motorcyclist at an intersection. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Instead of stopping, Hansen 
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chose to leave the scene of the accident "at a high rate of speed." (PSI, p.2.) 
The victim's injuries were extensive and had a profound impact on the victim's 
life. (PSI, p.3; Tr., p.34, L.10 - p.36, L.3.) As stated by the district court, "this is 
not a DUI. This is an aggravated DUI and one that, frankly, was of a very 
heinous injury and heinous conduct that led you to leave the scene and all the 
rest that really makes this, from the court's prospective, one of aggravation .... " 
(Tr., p.64, Ls.5-10.) The district court went on to state that "people cannot be 
harmed to this degree and simply said, well, the response for that in the societal 
perspective is just some months in jail, some rehabilitation, and hope in the 
future that this time you really get it." (Tr., p.65, Ls.1-6.) 
The district court appropriately determined that a period of incarceration 
was necessary to protect the public and imposed reasonable sentences. The 
sentences imposed were appropriate in light of the seriousness of Hansen's 
offenses, the danger he poses to society, and his failure to rehabilitate in the 
community. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Hansen has failed to 
establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Hansen's appeal 
from his sentence for aggravated DUI and affirm Hansen's conviction and 
sentence for leaving the scene of an injury accident. 
DATED this 28th day of March 2012. 
JA~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of March 2012, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JMG/pm 
17 
